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This paper explores the nature of vertical intra-industry trade: the exchange of an
intermediate good and a ﬁnal good that requires the intermediate good in the same industry.
A factor endowment model is extended to a setting with a technological di#erence in the
production of the intermediate good between countries. Unlike the result of the existing work,
the share of intra-industry trade does not reach a peak when countries have identical factor
endowment ratios. This paper shows that a di#erence in factor intensities between intra-
industry goods plays a crucial role in deriving this result.
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I. Introduction
Most of the theoretical work on intra-industry trade focused on horizontal intra-industry
trade, the exchange of di#erentiated products that have the same factor intensity in their
production. In recent years, another type of intra-industry trade has increased its importance
empirically. Vertical intra-indsutry trade is the exchange of intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods
that use the intermediate goods for their production.
1 The production processes of manufac-
turing, which used to be integrated within one country, have been fragmented across countries
due to the improvement of transport and communication technology and the movement of
trade liberalization in developing as well as developed nations. Such fragmentation causes
 This paper is based on one chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to University of Rochester. I would
like to thank my adviser, Ron Jones for valuable comments. I would also like to thank seminar participants at
University of Rochester, Kobe University, Keio University, and Midwest International Trade Meetings at Univer-
sity of Minnesota for helpful discussions.
 Phone: 81-42-580-8528, Fax: 82-42-580-8882
1 Grubel and Lloyd (1975) noted, “Vertical intra-industry specialization may take several forms. It may involve
the exchange between countries of certain ﬁnal products by an industry for intermediate products used by the
industry.” Note that vertical intra-industry trade is also used to mean the exchange of ﬁnal goods having di#erent
quality.
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 45 (2004), pp.67-79.  Hitotsubashi Universityvertical intra-industry trade since, in some manufacturing sectors, ﬁnal goods, parts, and
components are classiﬁed in the same industry.
2 For example, in automobile industries, “Sixty
percent of U.S. auto exports to Canada are engines and parts, while seventy ﬁve percent of U.
S. auto imports from Canada are ﬁnished cars and trucks” (Hummels et al. (1998)).
In this paper, I explore the nature of vertical intra-industry trade. For this purpose, I
develop a factor endowment model with a technological di#erence. Let us consider a typical
factor endowment model with two factors, two goods, and two countries. If countries are
identical except for factor endowment ratios, comparative advantage is determined according
to a factor endowment di#erence. In free trade equilibrium, a capital abundant country
exports a capital-intensive good and imports a labor-intensive good. Suppose that a production
process for one good consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, an intermediate good is produced
with production factors. In the second stage, the intermediate good is transformed into a ﬁnal
good by using production factors. If another good is produced only with production factors
and does not require multiple production stages, then the basic model is extended to a setting
with two ﬁnal goods and one intermediate good. I introduce a technical di#erence into this
extended setting. In addition to a factor endowment di#erence, there is asymmetry in
production technology of the intermediate good between countries. In this extended setting,
there are two causes for trade. A technical di#erence determines the direction of trade ﬂows
in the intermediate good. A factor endowment di#erence determines the pattern of trade in
two ﬁnal goods. I show that vertical intra-industry trade arises under this mechanism, and
exaime its nature in trade equilibrium.
This paper is related to the recent theoretical work on trade such as Dixit and Norman
(1981), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Davis (1995). Dixit and Norman (1981) and
Helpman and Krugman (1985) emphasized the role of imperfect competition and increasing
returns as driving forces for intra-industry trade. On the other hand, Davis (1995) developed
a model with perfect competition and constant returns and showed that intra-industry trade
arises due to comparative advantage. Their work investigated only horizontal intra-industry
trade and reached the same proposition: the share of intra-industry trade in total trade is
maximized when countries have identical factor endowment ratios. I modify a framework
developed by Davis (1995) to focus on vertical intra-industry trade. I show that the share of
vertical intra-industry trade has a single peak in a graph showing its dependence on factor
endowment ratios. However, unlike the case of horizontal intra-industry trade, the share does
not reach the peak at a point in which countries have identical factor endowment ratios. I
examine a cause for this divergence and show that a di#erence in the factor intensities of
intra-industry goods plays a crucial role in deriving this result.
3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop a factor endowment
model with a technological di#erence. Using an integrated equilibrium approach, I illustrate a
factor price equalization set. In Section 3, I examine the pattern of trade and show that vertical
intra-industry trade arises in trade equilibrium. In Section 4, I investigate the value of trade by
2 Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch.13) stated, “at the existing levels of disaggregation of empirical data,
ﬁnished goods and intermediate inputs that are used in their production often appear in the same category;
electronics, chemicals, and wood products are examples of industries in which it occurs.”
3 Trade in intermediate goods was also investigated in the recent theoretical work such as Dixit and Grossman
(1982), Ethier (1982), Sanyal and Jones (1982), and Helpman (1985). This paper di#ers from their work in that
they did not examine the nature of vertical intra-industry trade.
[June =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H 02illustrating the level curves of trade values. I also examine a relation between the share of
intra-industry trade and factor endowment ratios. In Section 5, I close this paper with
concluding remarks.
II. The Model
I develop a model with two countries, two factors and three goods. There are two ﬁnal
goods X and Y and one intermediate good Z. The ﬁnal good X uses two production factors,
capital K and labor L, and one intermediate good Z in its production. The production of the
ﬁnal good Y uses only capital and labor. The intermediate good Z also requires capital and
labor in its production. I assume that the ﬁnal good X and the intermediate good Z are
classiﬁed in the same industry. Therefore, a direct exchange of X and Z is vertical intra-
industry trade.
Two countries, Home and Foreign, share identical technologies in the production of X
and Y. I assume there exists a Hicks-neutral technical di#erence in the production of Z
between countries.
4 In Home, X, Y,a n dZ are produced with
XFX(KX, LX, Z), (1)
YFY(KY, LY), (2)
ZAFZ(KZ, LZ) (3)
where Fi(iX, Y, Z) is a constant returns to scale production function. In Foreign, production
functions are as follows:
X*FX(K* X, L* X, Z*), (4)
Y*FY(K* Y, L* Y), (5)
Z*FZ(K* Z, L* Z) (6)
I assume that A1 holds. This implies that Home has a technical advantage in the production
of the intermediate good Z.
1. Integrated Equilibrium
Let us consider the equilibrium of an integrated world economy. In an integrated world,
production factors as well as goods can move freely between countries. The allocation of
integrated equilibrium can be reproduced through trade in goods if factor endowment
distribution belongs to a factor price equalization set. The goal of this section is to characterize
the factor price equalization set of endowment distributions.
5
I assume that every market is perfectly competitive. In an integrated world, factor prices
4 Davis (1995) introduced a Hicks-neutral technical di#erence to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework and showed
that “increasing returns are not necessary for intra-industry trade.” He assumed that there exists a technical
di#erence in the production of a ﬁnal good so that he could analyze the horizontal intra-industry trade in ﬁnal
goods.
5 This approach is also used by Dixit and Norman (1980), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Davis (1995).
2004] K:GI>86A >CIG6->C9JHIGN IG69: 6C9 ;68IDG EGDEDGI>DCH 03are equalized between countries and thus the intermediate good Z is produced only at Home.
Let the ﬁnal good Y be the numeraire. The competitive conditions for the goods markets are
1cY(w, r), (7)
pXcX(w, r, pZ), (8)
pZcZ(w, r), (9)
where pi(iX, Y, Z) is a price of a good i and ci(iX, Y, Z) is a unit cost function of a good
i. The unit cost of X, cX, depends on the intermediate good price pZ, wages w, and rental rates
r.
The production factors are fully employed in the integrated factor markets. Let X X, Y Y and
Z Z denote the outputs of X, Y and Z in the integrated equilibrium. The resource constraints are
aLX(w, r, pZ)X XaLY(w, r)Y YaLZ(w, r)Z ZL L, (10)
aKX(w, r, pZ)X XaKY(w, r)Y YaKZ(w, r)Z ZK K, (11)
where aLj(cj/(w, aKj(cj/(r(jX, Y, Z). The vector (L L, K K) denotes ﬁxed amounts of labor












The intermediate good Z is the most capital intensive and the ﬁnal good Y is the most labor
intensive.
Preferences are assumed to be homothetic and identical. Let a (pX) be a share of spending





aZX(w, r, pZ)X XZ Z, (14)
where aZX(cX/(pZ.L e tV(K, L)a n dV*(K*, L*) be factor endowments of Home and
Foreign respectively. Now we are ready to construct the factor price equalization set of
endowment distributions (V, V*). Let E(i)( iX, Y, Z) denote an employment vector of a
sector i in the integrated equilibrium.
E(X)(aLXX X, aKXX X) (15)
E(Y)(aLYY Y, aKYY Y) (16)
E(Z)(aLZZ Z, aKZZ Z) (17)
The factor price equalization set FTP is characterized as follows:
6 In the following section, I shall discuss the role of this assumption in deriving results.






(V, V*):(li, l* i)0, lil* i1f o riX, Y,





 SiX, Y, Zl* i E(i)V*
(18)
In Fig. 1, the FPE set is drawn as a parallelogram O QO*Q . Recall that the intermediate good
Z is produced only at Home due to its technical advantage. This implies that the employment
vector E(Z) is drawn as a ray from Home’s origin O, and as aresult, Home’s origin for the
employment vectors E(X)a n dE(Y)i sO .
7 If the distribution of factor endowments belongs
to the FPE set, the allocation of the integrated equilibrium is reproduced through international
trade in goods. In the next section, I shall examine the exact relationship between trade
patterns and factor endowments.
III. The Pattern of Trade
Suppose that the distribution of factor endowments is E1 in Fig. 2. The intersection of the
diagonal OO* and the isoincome line BB determines the relative GDP level of Home:
GDP/GDP*OC OC/O*C O*C. This relative GDP level also equals  OC OC  CO * CO * because CCis parallel
to OO . Since preferences are homothetic and identical, the relative consumption level of Home
7 The conﬁguration of the FPE set in Fig. 1 is similar to that obtained in the case of oligopoly (Helpman and
Krugman (1985, Ch.5)). Suppose that the Z sector is oligopolistic with a given number of ﬁrms in each country
and countries have the same technology for the production of Z. Then each country’s fraction of the world output
of Z equals the share of each country in the total number of ﬁrms. Thus, the FPE set in Fig. 1 is equivalent to
that obtained in the case in which the share of the home country in the total number of ﬁrms equals one, and
thus, Z is produced exclusively by home ﬁrms.
F><.1 . T =: FPE S:I
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by  OC X OC X(  OC Y) OC Y). The pattern of production is also derived easily. Home specializes in the
production of X and Z, the outputs of which are given by  OE 1 OE 1 and  OO OO respectively. Now we
can derive the pattern of trade: Home exports Z and X, and imports Y when the endowment
allocation is E1. Home exports the capital intensive goods X and Z. This is consistent with the
prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Observe that there is no vertical intra-industry
trade.
8
Let us move the endowment allocation to the southeast along the isoincome line BB .T h e
pattern of consumption does not change because the relative GDP level of each country
remains constant along the isoincome line BB . The pattern of trade is a#ected only through a
change in the pattern of production. Home is still the exporter of the capital intensive goods
X and Z until the endowment allocation reaches E2. When the endowment allocation reaches
E2, Home produces as much X as it consumes. That is, the production of X is lowered to the
level of self-su$ciency. The capital abundant home country exports the capital intensive good
Z for the imports of the labor intensive good Y.
If the distribution of factor endowments is in the interior of E2E3, Home exports Z for the
imports of the both X and Y. Now we observe vertical intra-industry trade. Foreign imports
the intermediate good Z and combines it with production factors to make the ﬁnal good X.
Some outputs of the ﬁnal good X produced at Foreign are exported to Home. Note that the
capital abundant home country now imports the capital intensive ﬁnal good X. This seems to
be paradoxical from the viewpoint of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, but it is really not. Home
8 It is also easy to obtain the net factor content of trade. The factor content of consumption at Home is
described as OC. Therefore, E1C is the net factor content of trade. The capital abundant home country is a net
exporter of capital services and a net importer of labor services. Note that a country never becomes a net importer
or exporter of all factors’ services. The reason is that each country’s share of world spending equals its share of
world factor income (i.e. trade is balanced).
F><.2 . T =: P6II:GC D; TG69:
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 1,earns income from the exports of the most capital intensive good Z and spends its income on
importing X and Y, which are relatively more labor intensive than Z.
9 If the endowment
allocation reaches E3, the home consumption of Y equals its own production so that there is no
trade in Y. The capital abundant home country now exports Z and imports X. Trade consists
purely of vertical intra-industry trade.
Finally, if the endowment allocation is in the interior of E3E4 or coincides with E4, Home
exports Y and Z, and imports X. This trade pattern also seems to be surprising because, at any
endowment point between E3 and E4, the capital abundant home country exports the most
labor intensive good Y. However, this can be interpreted as follows. Suppose we subtract the
employment vector of the intermediate good from the factor endowments of Home. Then,
Home is regarded as a relatively more labor abundant country in terms of net factor
endowments. In terms of net factor endowments, this pattern of trade is consistent with the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem.
IV. The Value of Trade
In this section, I examine the e#ects of factor endowment ratios on the value of trade.
Trade is composed of intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade. The value of each trade
component as well as the total value of trade is analyzed by illustrating level curves in the
factor price equalization set. I also investigate the e#ects of factor endowment ratios on the
share of intra-industry trade. Unlike the proposition derived in the existing work, the share
does not reach a peak when countries have identical factor endowment ratios. I examine why
there is a di#erence in results between this paper and the existing work.
1. The Value of Intra-Industry Trade
The previous section shows that trade patterns depend on the distribution of factor
endowments. According to these trade patterns, we can divide the FPE set into three regions
by the two dividing lines, AO* and A O* (see Fig. 3). The dividing line AO* is the locus of
self-su#ciency of X and the other line A O* is the locus of the self-su#ciency of Y.
10 It is
convenient to label these subsets as follows: AQO*: S1, O AO*A : S2,a n dA O*Q : S3. The value
of intra-industry trade VTintra is deﬁned here as a value of direct exchange of X and Z.I ft h e
distribution of factor endowments is in S1, there is no intra-industry trade. Therefore, VTintra
equals zero in S1.
In S2, Home exports Z for the imports of X and Y. The value of intra-industry trade is
VTintrapX(sX XX)
where sGDP/(GDPGDP*) is the relative size of Home as measured by GDP and
9 Melvin (1989) also showed the similar kind of “surprising” trade pattern in his article on trade in producer
services. In this article, he showed that a capital abundant country imports a capital intensive good for the export
of capital services. He argued that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem holds in this case because capital services are
more capital intensive than any other goods.
10 These two dividing lines are linear because E2E3 E2E3 falls (rises) proportionally with the relative size of Home
(Foreign).
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In Fig. 3, the segment AO* is a locus of self-su$ciency of X. If the distribution of factor
endowments is on this locus, the value of intra-industry trade always equals zero. This implies
that the level curves of the value of intra-industry trade in S2 are parallel to the self-su$ciency
line AO*(see Fig. 3). Observe that the value of vertical intra-industry trade increases as we
move the endowment point toward E3 along the isoincome line BB .
If the factor endowment point is in S3, Home exports Y and Z for the import of X.T h e










The ratio of X to X X keeps constant if the endowment point moves parallel to O Q . Therefore,
the level curves of the value of intra-industry trade are parallel to O Q(see Fig. 3). The value
of intra-industry trade becomes larger, as we move the factor endowment point along the
isoincome line BBtoward E4.
11
In short, as we move the distribution of factor endowments along the isoincome line from
E1 to E4, VTintra equals zero in S1, and increases in S2 and S3. If the relative size of each country
is constant and the endowment point is in S2 and S3, the value of intra-industry trade decreases
with the capital labor ratio of Home.
2. The Value of Inter-Industry Trade
Let us turn to inter-industry trade. The value of inter-industry trade is represented here
as the value of the export of Y. Above the self-su#ciency line of Y, A O*, Foreign exports Y,
11 This is because VTintra decreases with X/X X that declines as Home becomes relatively more labor abundant.
F><.3 . T =: V6AJ: D; ICIG6->C9JHIGN TG69:
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 1.but below AO*, Home is the exporter of Y. Therefore, the value of inter-industry trade is
derived as follows.
S1 and S2: VTinterY*s*Y Y
S3: VTinterYsY Y
On the self-su$ciency line of Y, A O*, VTinter is constant (equals zero). Thus, the level curves
of the value of inter-industry trade are parallel to A O* (see Fig. 4). Observe that the value of
inter-industry trade increases as we move the factor endowment point further away from the
self-su$ciency line of Y, A O*.
3. The Total Value of Trade
The total value of trade equals the export value of either country. In S1, Home exports X










Notice that VT increases with X as long as the relative size of Home, s, is constant.
12 In
other words, the total value of trade decreases as Foreign produces more of X.I nS1 there is
no intra-industry trade and thus the total value of trade equals the value of inter-industry
trade. This implies that the level curves of VT are identical to those of inter-industry trade (see
Fig. 5).
In S2, Home exports Z for the imports of X and Y. The total value of trade is as follows.
12 We can rewrite VT as follows, VT
X
X X
(pXX XpZZ Z)pXsX XpZZ Z. This implies that VT increases with X.
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In contrast to the case of S1, VT decreases with X in S2. The intermediate good Z is
produced only at Home and thus the export of Z increases with the production of X at
Foreign. In S2, the level curves are parallel to O Qbecause X/X X is constant on O Q .












The home import volume of X is constant on the self-su$ciency line of X, so the level curves
of VT are parallel to AO*.I nS3, VT increases with the foreign production of X as long as the
size of each country is kept constant.
The result is summarized as follows. Suppose the size of each country does not change.
Then, the total value of trade reaches the minimum level on the self-su$ciency line of X, AO*,
and rises as the endowment point moves further away from the self-su$ciency line AO*.
13
4. The Share of Intra-Industry Trade
Now let us examine the share of intra-industry trade. The share is represented as the ratio
13 In other words, the total value of trade does not necessarily increase with a di#erence in relative factor
endowments. Phillips (1991, Ch.4) showed that the similar kind of result can be obtained in a model with
increasing returns-to-scale in homogeneous goods.
F><.5 . T =: TDI6A V6AJ: D; TG69:




Since the sum of the value of intra-industry and inter-industry trade equals the total value of




SI is maximized when the share of inter-industry trade is minimized. Fig. 4 shows that the
value of inter-industry trade reaches the minimum level, zero, on the self-su$ciency line of Y,
A O*. Thus, on the the self-su$ciency line A O*, SI reaches the value of one and thus it is
maximized. This result suggests that the share of vertical intra-industry trade has a single peak,
but it does not reach the peak on the diagonal of the box diagram OO* (see Fig. 3). Unlike the
proposition obtained in the exiting work, the share of intra-industry trade does not reach 100
percent when countries have identical factor endowment ratios. In the rest of this section, I
shall examine why we obtain this result.
In Fig. 3, the share of intra-industry trade is maximized on A O*. For instance, if the
endowment point is given by E3, the home output of Y equals the self su$ciency level, and
thus, trade is purely vertical. Home exports the intermediate good Z for the import of the ﬁnal
good X. Since the endowment point E3 is not on the diagonal OO*, the share of intra-industry
trade is not maximized when countries have identical endowment ratios. A crucial reason for
this result is a di#erence in the factor intensity between X and Z.I fX and Z have identical
factor intensities, OOhas the same slope as O Q. Then, the self-su$ciency line A O* coincides
with the diagonal OO*. This implies that the share of intra-industry trade is maximized on the
diagonal OO*.
Davis (1995) focused on horizontal intra-industry trade, the exchange of di#erent ﬁnal
goods having the same factor intensity. He showed that the share of intra-industry trade is
maximized when countries have identical factor endowment ratios. We can reach the same
proposition as derived in Davis (1995) if the intermediate good Z has the same factor intensity
as the ﬁnal good X. Nonetheless, if there is a di#erence in factor intensity between them, the
proposition fails to hold.
14 Therefore, whether the proposition holds or not crucially depends
on a factor intensity di#erence between goods that are classiﬁed in the same industry. Factor
intensity di#erences between intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods that use the intermediate
inputs could be much larger as compared to those between ﬁnal goods that are closely
substituted with each other. It is more likely that the proposition fails to hold if the vertical
aspect of intra-industry trade is taken into account.
14 The assumption on the factor intensity ranking (12) does not matter for this result. For example, suppose
that good Y is relatively more capital intensive than other two goods X and Z. Then, the share of intra-industry
trade is not maximized on the diagonal as long as X and Z have di#erent factor intensities.
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In this paper, I develop a simple model that is used to investigate the nature of vertical
intra-industry trade. This paper departs from the existing work in that it has focused on
vertical intra-industry trade although most existing work investigated only horizontal intra-
industry trade. I modify a framework developed by Davis (1995) that assumes constant
returns and perfect competition. As a result, a mechanism that causes intra-industry trade is
a principle of comparative advantage. Unlike the result derived by Davis (1995), the share of
intra-industry trade does not reach a peak at a point in which countries have identical factor
endowment ratios. The reason for this result is in an assumption that an intermediate good and
a ﬁnal good that are in the same industry do not have the same factor intensity. This suggests
that whether goods that are classiﬁed in the same industry have identical factor intensities or
not plays an important role in explaining the behavior of the share of intra-industry trade.
This paper does not make any empirical investigation of vertical intra-indsutry trade.
Using input-output tables, Hummels et al. (1998) empirically investigated the volume of
vertical trade in intermediate goods and ﬁnal goods. However, they did not examined the
nature of vertical intra-industry trade. Input-output tables might be useful to do some
empirical work on vertical intra-industry trade. For example, it seems to be an easy exercise to
calculate the indices of intra-industry trade. Furthermore, it is an interesting attempt to
compare them with the indices of horizontal intra-industry trade and explore a systematic
di#erence between vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade.
R:;:G:C8:H
Davis, D. R. (1995) “Intra-industry Trade: A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach.” Journal
of International Economics 39, pp.201-226.
Dixit, A. K. and G. M. Grossman (1982) “Trade and Protection with Multistage Production.”
Review of Economic Studies 49, pp.583-594.
Dixit, A. K. and V. Norman (1980) Theory of International Trade, Cambridge University
Press.
Ethier, W. J. (1982) “National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of
International Trade.” American Economic Review 49, pp.583-594.
Grubel, H. G. and P. J. Lloyd (1975) Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement of
International Trade in Di#erentiated Products, John Wiley and Sons.
Helpman, E. (1985) “International Trade in Di#erentiated Middle Products.” In Hauge, D
and K. G. Jungenfelt, editors, Structural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies,
Macmillan.
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade, The MIT Press.
Hummels, D., D. Rapoport, and K. M. Yi (1998) “Vertical Specialization and the Changing
Nature of World Trade.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review June, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, pp.79-99.
Melvin, J. R. (1989) “Trade in Producer Services: A Heckscher-Ohlin Approach.” Journal of
Political Economy 97, pp.1180-1196.
=>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H [June 12Phillips, K. L. (1991) Essays on International Economics. Ph.D. thesis, University of Roches-
ter.
Sanyal, K. K. and R. W. Jones. (1982) “The Theory of Trade in Middle Products.” American
Economic Review 72, pp.16-31.
Yomogida, M. (2003) Essays on International Trade. Ph.D. thesis, University of Rochester.
K:GI>86A >CIG6->C9JHIGN IG69: 6C9 ;68IDG EGDEDGI>DCH 2004] 13